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Abstract: As the computing landscape evolves towards distributed architectures such as Internet of Things (IoT), 
enterprises are moving away from traditional perimeter based security models toward so called “zero trust 
networking” (ZTN) models that treat both the intranet and Internet as equally untrustworthy. Such security 
models incorporate risk arising from dynamic and situational factors, such as device location and security 
risk level risk, into the access control decision. Researchers have developed a number of risk models such as 
RAdAC (Risk Adaptable Access Control) to handle dynamic contexts and these have been applied to 
medical and other scenarios.  In this position paper we describe our ongoing work to apply RAdAC to ZTN. 
We develop a policy management framework, FURZE, to facilitate fuzzy risk evaluation that also defines 
how to adapt to dynamically changing contexts. We also consider how enterprise security situational 
awareness (SSA) - which describes the potential impact to an organisations mission based on the current 
threats and the relative importance of the information asset under threat - can be incorporated into a RAdAC 
scheme.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
The enterprise computing landscape has evolved 
considerably over the last decade with the 
emergence of technologies such as cloud computing 
and mobile devices, including the “bring your own 
device”, (BYOD) phenomenon. These trends are 
likely to be amplified even further in coming years 
with the increasing deployment of Internet of Things 
(IoT) applications. Also, over the same period, there 
has been a dramatic escalation in both the number 
and sophistication of security-attacks on business 
(Broadhurst et. al. 2014).  
This combination puts pressure on the traditional 
perimeter based security model toward the 
application of so called “zero trust networking” 
(ZTN) models that treat the intranet with the same 
degree, i.e. lack, of trust as the internet (Forrester 
Research, 2013). Access control decisions are now 
made based on the degree of trust in the user and the 
device, irrespective of whether the user is inside or 
outside the internal network (Ward and Beyer, 
2014). Furthermore the level of access assigned to a 
device or user may change over time and the access 
control system is able to dynamically infer the 
current trust level by consulting various data sources 
and make decisions accordingly. 
One approach to the capability of an access 
control system to adapt dynamically to changing 
context is Risk-Adaptable Access Control (RAdAC), 
(McGraw, 2009). The key concept of RAdAC is the 
trade-off, or balance, between operational need and 
security risk when making access control decisions - 
in some conditions operational need will override 
security risk and access to otherwise restricted 
resources will be granted. RAdAC was originally 
proposed for highly variable environments such as 
those in the military but is increasingly seen applied 
in other situations characterised by dynamic contexts 
such as medical emergencies and the IoT.  
Similarly, dynamic access control for enterprise 
networks has been considered for some time, 
(Fernandez, 2006) and is becoming ever more 
appropriate as the variety and sophistication of 
security attacks and the complexity of these 
networks increases (Farroha and Farroha, 2012). The 
types of factors used for access control in enterprise 
ZTN scenarios includes user and device as well as 
situational factors such as location and access 
 history, (Ward and Beyer, 2014; Vensmer and 
Kiesel, 2012).  
In most applications of RAdAC described to date 
the focus has been relaxation of the access controls 
in order to maximise the benefit for the organisation 
by granting temporary access to restricted objects. In 
certain cases however the goal might be to restrict 
access as e.g. in the case of heightened security 
situation (Fernandez, 2006) and it is this particular 
issue we address here.  
In particular we consider how enterprise security 
situational awareness (SSA) - which describes the 
potential impact to an organisations mission based 
on the current threats and the relative importance of 
the information asset under threat - can be 
incorporated into a RAdAC scheme. We extend the 
RAdAC model of Kandala, Sandhu and Bhamidipati 
(2011), in this direction and define a framework to 
manage risk based access control in zero trust 
networks.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 describes the background 
concepts. Section 3 describes our proposed RAdAC 
approach to zero-trust networking. Section 4 
describes related work while conclusions and future 
work are outlined in Section 5. 
2 BACKGROUND  
2.1 Access Control 
For many years the dominant model of access 
control has been Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC). RBAC is centred around the notion of 
authorisation via groups or roles i.e. access rights are 
allocated to a group rather than an individual.  
However RBAC has limitations for the evolving 
enterprise computing landscape. In particular it does 
not very well support multi-factor decisions such as 
those based on location, special training received 
etc. as well as rank in the organisation, (Hu et al. 
2013) Nor are it’s primarily static role definitions 
well suited for dynamic access control decisions. As 
a result a more dynamic access control approach has 
been proposed i.e. Attribute Based Access Control 
(ABAC), (OASIS 2013). ABAC decisions are based 
on the use of subject and object attributes and 
enables very flexible access control capabilities. 
ABAC also introduces the concepts of obligations 
and access based on environment conditions. 
Obligations are additional actions required by the 
subject as part of pre- or post-conditions of granting 
authorisation.  Environment conditions enable the 
inclusion of context specific criteria into the access 
control decision-making such as the location of the 
user, the state of emergency in a hospital theatre etc. 
ABAC systems are beginning to see significant 
deployment in the enterprise including use for 
dynamic access control based on environment 
conditions, (Osborne et al. 2016; Vensmer and 
Kiesel, 2012).  
While ABAC significantly increases the 
dynamic capability of access control systems it does 
not include the capability to factor risk into 
authorisation decision-making. To this end McGraw 
(2009) proposed an extension of ABAC to manage 
dynamic risk assessment - the Risk Adaptable 
Access Control (RAdAC) concept. According to 
McGraw (2009) – “RAdAC incorporates a real time, 
probabilistic determination of security risk into the 
access control decision rather than just using a hard 
comparison of the attributes of the subject and object 
as in traditional models”.  RAdAC is based on 
assessing the trade-off between security risk and 
operational need. The definition of these terms is 
very much context and organisation dependent 
though possible inputs to security risk determination 
could include e.g. trust in user or device, the current 
threat level, sensitivity, or criticality to the mission, 
of the requested  
Figure 1: UCON Model with RAdAC Components, (from 
Kandala, Sandhu and Bhamidipati 2011). 
information, role of the user etc. (Farroha and 
Farroha, 2012). 
Kandala, Sandhu and Bhamidipati (2011) define 
an abstract model for RAdAC in terms of the “Usage 
Connection” (UCON) access control approach–
shown in Figure 1. UCON is an extended access 
control approach that seeks to unify both traditional 
access control i.e. access at the start of the 
transaction with the need for on-going control of 
 access to the object during the transaction – what 
UCON terms decision continuity. This latter 
property is a significant addition to RAdAC as it 
allows adaptation to changing environment 
conditions. In Figure 1 above the subject concept has 
been decomposed into a number of components i.e. 
users, devices, connections and purposes. The 
usage/access control decision process is shown to 
include a Risk Evaluation component as well 
predicate/rule-based components for Authorisation, 
(based on the attributes) Obligations (as for ABAC) 
and Conditions (captures the environmental 
conditions). Usage access decision-making is based 
on all three rule/predicate components i.e. 
authorisation, obligation and conditions and all can 
be evaluated pre, during or post the session. 
2.2 Zero Trust Networking 
There is an increasing move away from the 
traditional perimeter-based security approach both in 
the enterprise and in cloud computing (Ward and 
Beyer 2014). This trend has been dubbed “Zero 
Trust Networking” (Forrester, 2013). The key 
element of this approach is to treat the internal 
network as untrusted to the same degree as the 
Internet. This usually entails partitioning the internal 
network into a number of network segments or zones 
each of which houses different functions and 
information. Each zone may have a different trust 
level that indicates the importance of the assets 
housed within the zone (Gontarczyk et al. 2015). In 
order to access an asset, a subject’s trust level 
assignment must be equal to or greater than the 
zone’s minimum trust level (Osborne et al. 2016). 
Traffic between zones is thus restricted by firewalls 
in accordance with the overall access control policy. 
Access control in ZTN is transaction based and 
dynamic i.e. a decision is made for each access 
request and firewall rules are updated as a result of 
each decision. Access control decisions are based on 
user and device attributes as well as environment  
attributes such as location. Deployments include 
enterprise security e.g. Google’s BeyondCorp 
(Osborne et al. 2016) as well as campus (Vensmer 
and Kiesel 2012) and cloud computing security 
(Giannakou et al. 2016). 
 
2.3 Mission Impact Modelling 
As outlined above environmental factors that are 
critical parameters in determining situational risk 
include those relating to the current threat level and 
the business or mission criticality of the related 
assets. This approach can also play a part in the 
access control system to determine if access should 
be granted based on the criticality of the resource 
being accessed and the current threat level.  
At the heart of this approach is the “mission 
dependency graph” (Holspopple and Yang 2013; 
Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu 2006; Jakobson 
2011; Watters et al. 2009).  The mission dependency  
graph maps the organisations strategic mission 
objectives to the IT assets by defining, and 
prioritising, the dependencies between both via the 
different layers of the graph i.e. business objectives 
are realised (depend on) by business functions and 
processes which in turn are, completely or partly, 
realised (depend on) by IT capabilities and assets. 
The edges in the graph record a causal 
relationship/influence between two nodes and may 
be assigned a weighting to reflect the extent of that 
influence as in Holspopple and Yang (2013) and 
Watters et al. (2009). These values are typically 
assigned through consultation with key business and 
IT personnel responsible for the various processes 
and components that constitute the graph.  
A mission graph is used for two complementary 
purposes. Firstly it is used to assign to each IT asset 
an asset criticality dependent on the particular 
missions or business goals it supports. This is done 
by trickling the mission objective priority down the 
graph to the individual asset. This feature is used to 
help analysts improve situational awareness as 
discussed above. Secondly the degree of severity of 
a particular threat to a particular asset can be 
evaluated to determine the risk to the mission 
objectives by percolating the risk up the graph. This 
risk assessment feature can be used for off-line 
what-if analyses and it also forms the basis for our 
situational awareness risk based access control. 
Another consideration that must be taken into 
account is how the base impact -the impact to the 
information asset at the root of the mission tree that 
is the subject of a threat - is calculated. Watters 
(2009) uses vulnerability severity as a base for his 
calculation as does Jakobson (2011). Holspopple and 
Yang (2013) simply assume a measure of impact 
without specifying how it may be calculated while 
Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) do not 
address the issue at all. 
3 FURZE 
 Whilst Kandala, Sandhu and Bhamidipati (2011) 
have provided a sound abstract model for “UCON-
ised” RAdAC a number of significant research 
questions remain open around the practical 
 deployment of RAdAC. Our area of interest is to 
explore enforcement architecture issues for the 
application of RAdAC in ZTN through the 
development of a policy enforcement framework 
that we designate FURZE (Fuzzy Risk Framework 
for ZTN). 
Specific issues we wish to investigate include i) 
the definition of a policy management architecture to 
include the on-going monitoring needed to enable 
decision continuity in ZTN access, ii) the design of 
an access control policy language to specify and 
manage such updates, iii) the design a risk 
evaluation function based on fuzzy logic to enable 
probabilistic access control decisions to be taken and 
iv) to investigate how the proposed approach works 
for enterprise security situational awareness.  
The starting point for FURZE is strongly hinted 
by Kandala, Sandhu and Bhamidipati (2011) in 
Figure 1. This contains a number of elements that 
form the functional, logical and linguistic basis for 
the proposed policy framework for ZTN shown in 
Figure 2. The architecture is broadly based on the 
XACML policy framework (OASIS 2013). Access 
requests are received via a Policy Enforcement Point 
(PEP) as e.g. a WiFi base station. The Context 
Handler coordinates the access control process 
including decision continuity handling. The 
Environment Evaluation contains plug-in 
components that convert session and other relevant 
factors into attributes that can be used for risk 
evaluation e.g. through the use of rules. Examples 
include SSA (discussed below), operational need 
and locations - for a simple access control case these 
components could simply default to session 
attributes. The Risk Evaluation Function and Access 
Decision Function jointly act as a Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) to control access while the subject and 
object attributes are stored in a management 
database. The Firewall Provisioning module 
converts generic firewall rules to device specific 
filtering rules for appropriate firewalls.  
 In FURZE the application of decision continuity 
imposes the need on the access control function to 
maintain session state information so that access 
control can adapt to reflect situational or other 
influencing factors that change the balance between 
operational need and security risk and trigger policy 
re-evaluation. Risk assessment is made as part of the 
initial authorisation predicate evaluation and, 
possibly, subsequently as part of either an 
authorisation or condition predicate evaluation that 
in turn has been triggered by some event during the 
session. 
The definition of the FURZE policy language 
will be based on i) subject and object entities and 
their attributes and ii) policy rules formed from 
authorisation and condition predicates. The subject 
entity is decomposed into a number of components 
that including e.g. device (from which the user  
requests access), purpose, which reflects operational 
need and is the underlying reason for the users 
access  
Figure 2: FURZE Framework. 
request, local situational factors impacting the 
individual user e.g. location etc. Objects define the 
services, data and other resources users wish to 
access. Global situational factors such as enterprise 
security risk are evaluated as condition predicates 
independent of any individual user.  
For the ZTN specific case the BeyondCorp 
framework gives broad hints at policy factors while 
the DynFire framework also suggests some specific 
factors to consider as access control credentials  
(Vensmer and Kiesel 2012). Similarly previous work 
on policy management for firewall access control 
(e.g. Zhang et al. 2007) can contribute to the 
development of the policy language. The principal 
challenge here for FURZE is to combine selected 
elements of previous work with language constructs 
to incorporate i) decision continuity and ii) risk 
evaluation. Decision continuity will be handled in 
the Context Handler. 
Risk evaluation is at the heart of RAdAC access 
control languages, as RAdAC must include the 
capability to reckon with uncertainty. The proposed 
approach for risk evaluation in FURZE – through 
the Risk Evaluation component- will be based on the 
use of fuzzy logic inferencing. Fuzzy logic is a 
mathematically sound approach to draw 
unambiguous conclusions from vague or imprecise 
information and subjective if-then rules (Ni, Bertini 
and Lobo, 2010) and has been widely used for 
decision-making under uncertainty including risk 
assessment. Furthermore as Ni shows, fuzzy logic is 
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 flexible can be used to model a variety of access 
control approaches. In FURZE we propose to 
leverage existing fuzzy logic language developments 
– specifically the use of the Fuzzy Control Language 
(FCL) (IEC 61131-7 2000). FCL is a domain 
specific language (DSL) created for use in fuzzy 
control application in industrial automation. It 
enables the definition of domain relevant fuzzy 
concepts including linguistic variables, term sets and 
rule sets. The principal challenge is to wrap or 
embed the FCL risk evaluation into the overall 
FURZE policy language. This includes not just 
seamless language syntax but also satisfactorily 
resolving DSL implementation issues.  
Our proposed approach to evaluate mission 
impact  (via the SSA component) is based on the use 
of Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) (Kosko, 1986) to 
model both the information asset threat impact and 
the mission graph. FCM is a graph based approach 
to modelling systems in which the concepts that 
capture different aspects of the behaviour of the 
system as represented as nodes while weighted 
edges capture interactions between concepts that 
represent the dynamics of the system. We base our 
threat modelling on the approach proposed by 
Jakobson (2011) but extend it to deal with different 
aspects of impact relating to the security trio of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. We will 
use Rule Based Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (RB-FCM) to 
model the mission tree as it allows us to represent a 
richer set relationship than standard FCM (Carvalho 
and Tome, 1999). 
4   RELATED WORK 
In relation to RAdAC the present work can be 
regarded as an extension of the earlier conceptual 
work (Kandala, Sandhu and Bhamidipati (2011; 
Farroha and Farroha 2012) toward implementation 
of an enforcement architecture.  
Google has adopted a ZTN approach for access 
control that, as described, seems partly similar to the 
work defined here (Ward and Beyer 2013; Osborne 
et al. 2016). However they have not described the 
policy language, risk management or decision 
continuity implementation in detail. Vensmer and 
Kiesel (2012) describe Dynfire, an access control 
policy management framework for ZTN applied to a 
university campus that encompasses a number of the 
ideas described in our work. However it does not 
include either risk management nor decision 
continuity.  
Giannoku et al. (2016) describe AL-SAFE a 
ZTN access control implementation for cloud 
computing –however they also do not include policy 
language, risk management or decision continuity 
aspects.  
Firewall policy management is a mature research 
area and a number of authors have described have 
described efforts in this direction (Zhang et al. 2007; 
Lobo, Marchi and Provetti 2012; Cisco 2010). 
However none of these authors have described 
access control risk management as part of their 
contributions. 
A number of researchers have modelled the 
impact of information security attacks on the 
organisation business and mission (Jakobsson 2011; 
Innerhoffer—Oberperfler and Breu 2006; 
Holspopple and Yang, 2013). However none have 
included mission impact assessment as part of the 
access control decision continuity process.  
Cheng et al. (2007) developed a fuzzy logic 
approach to access control risk assessment that 
proposed the gradation of security risk as services of 
levels between “allow” and “deny” where each level 
has an associated risk mitigation countermeasure. 
Ni, Bertini, and Lobo (2010) investigated the 
applicability of fuzzy inference for risk based access 
control and concluded that the approach was flexible 
and scalable. Our work most closely matches that of 
Ni, Bertini, and Lobo (2010) as we also propose the 
use of fuzzy inference for risk calculation – however 
our scope of research is somewhat wider. 
5  CONCLUSION  
We have described a novel approach to risk 
based access control for ZTN networking. The key 
element of our contribution is a policy control 
framework based on UCON that facilitates 
situational awareness based decision continuity and 
which embeds a fuzzy inference component to make 
the actual risk estimates. Further we have shown 
how asset criticality based on mission importance 
can be used as part of the situational awareness 
process. Future areas of research are to implement 
and evaluate the proposed approach for a ZTN 
scenario and to investigate its applicability to 
virtualised networking in cloud computing and 
software-defined networking (SDN). 
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